History in fast-forward Logic and argumentation are a natural combination. Though the precise origins of logic are hidden in the mists of antiquity, reflection on patterns in legal or philosophical debate may have been one of the driving forces in the genesis of the discipline. But afterwards, the main emphasis over time shifted to consequence relations in an abstract universe of propositions, and the formal systems to which these give rise. Though contacts were never lost entirely between logic and the realities of discussion and debate, the 20 th century saw a deep split. come from pressure by others in discussion. I am interested in a richer structure of reasons, and that even in two ways: as support for our current beliefs, but just as well, as hooks for undermining these beliefs. Explanation is at the same time vulnerability.
can be found by applying the Brouwer fixed-point theorem. Moreover, when network activity is studied as proceeding over time, logic returns at a higher level, too -as a description for the resulting behaviours, and various interesting new modal and temporal languages have emerged in this investigation by Gabbay and his co-workers.
Clearly, this is an immense intellectual space to explore, and at the same time, Gabbay has engaged in an impressive community-building effort, through a stream of books and papers, including handbooks that pull separate research clans together. If you asked me, my stated opinion would be that I totally agree with this vision, and am happy to endorse and support it. Maybe this invited commentary should just stop here.
But the editors have asked me for a few comments on logic and argumentation from my own perspective. In what follows, I do so, raising some issues that intrigue methough without any attempt at definitive statements, since my thoughts are in flux.
Argumentation in logics of agency Well, first of all, my own interest in the area is a bit special. It is focused on understanding something often left out in the semantic study of rational agency where I have been active in recent years. Here is one example out of many. We model beliefs, but seldom the reasons for those beliefs. We model belief change, but we tend to ignore the fact that many belief changes in our lives come from pressure by others in discussion. I am interested in a richer structure of reasons, and that even in two ways: as support for our current beliefs, but just as well, as hooks for undermining these beliefs. Explanation is at the same time vulnerability.
And that is as things should be. After all, rationality and being 'reasonable' mean being able to provide reasons, and being swayed by them. Formal proof is a noncontender for modeling this, except in extreme cases. How to model this fine-grained level more precisely is also a central issue in epistemology. So, what logical models should we use for bringing out this richer structure of having and giving reasons?
Dynamics of reasoning, logic and games To me, the main point to be noted is a shift from statics to dynamics. 'Reasons' are not just a list of propositions to be ticked off.
Crucially, they also involve the activity of reasoning, and one of the most pregnant forms of that is discussion and argumentation. And to understand the latter, standard logical form is not enough, just as Toulmin said. We need to focus on the logic of procedure and process. That is the main thrust of my work on 'logical dynamics' in recent years, witness the trilogy van Benthem 1996 van Benthem , 2011 van Benthem , 2012 . By now there are dynamic logics for the basic actions of information update and belief change, as well as many others connected to these (questions, suggestions, or even commands) that together drive the stream of cognitive reality. While these are single update steps, a powerful model for the longer-term temporal process structure of all this are games where agents interact, using strategies toward certain goals. I myself believe that argumentation and conversation are game-like in essential respects -even if we cannot always compute equilibria in a standard economic style. That this is possible at many levels has been shown by authors like Lorenz & Lorenzen 1978, van Agency versus networks But then, I see some differences with the network paradigm.
The first is that the process view of argumentation presupposes interactive agency: and agency in the sense of dependent actions in response to new external informational inputs as well as observed actions of others seems absent from Dov's argumentation networks. They are structures of interactive reasons, not of the agents behind them.
The second difference is one in the basic notions that one cares about. The process view is about truth, meaning, and deliberation, and it results in game-theoretic strategies under our conscious control. To me, the intuitive thrust of the network view is different: we are essentially talking about dynamical systems that evolve over time, driven by some transition equation creating statistical patterns in the long run.
Processes and networks But in logic, things are never quite what they seem. Here is a second round of considerations. First, an argumentation network may be viewed as rich structure of reasons manipulated by agents, and as such, it could be used to provide fine-structure for the game states that I want in my process view. But this is only one way to go. We can also reinterpret the networks in an agent-oriented manner.
Think of the nodes as persons engaging in debate, and connection strengths as their complex informational effects on each other. When colleague X is in favor of proposal p, I will agree more with p, when colleague Y is in favor, I quickly cool off on p. Now 4 the network models the global drift of public opinion, and again, it connects with my process view, this time as a sort of higher-level longer-term super-structure. This is not just speculation. Concrete instances of such mixed approaches exist in current logical studies of belief networks (Quine & Ullian 1978 , Ghosh & Velazquez 2007 I find the distinction between network and process views a natural one, but the two also form a natural duality, and the cases of harmony I have given can easily be turned into spirals where one view keeps following up on the other. But I admit that the contrast may be elusive, since I have not defined it in any precise technical sense.
So let me just end by stating how I see the area of cognitive reality that we are after.
We humans live in a tiny range of the total physical scale of magnitude, where our body movements bring a few objects of the right size under our deliberate control.
'Below' us is the statistical molecular and atomic reality over which we have no control, 'above' us is the large-scale structure of the universe with the same lack of control. Likewise, cognitively, we live in a tiny little personal zone of deliberation and decision described by logical and game-theoretic models, with below us the statistical physics of brain processes, and above us the statistical realities of long-term social group behaviour. I have not yet seen one vision of logic that manages to unify all this, but Dov Gabbay's program certainly seems the most ambitious attempt so far.
